Indigenous Labour Arrangements and Household Security in Northern Pakistan by MacDonald, Ken I.
Himalaya, the Journal of the
Association for Nepal and
Himalayan Studies
Volume 16
Number 1 Himalayan Research Bulletin No. 1 & 2 Article 8
1996
Indigenous Labour Arrangements and Household
Security in Northern Pakistan
Ken I. MacDonald
University of Toronto
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya
This Research Report is brought to you for free and open access by the
DigitalCommons@Macalester College at DigitalCommons@Macalester
College. It has been accepted for inclusion in Himalaya, the Journal of the
Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more
information, please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.
Recommended Citation
MacDonald, Ken I. (1996) "Indigenous Labour Arrangements and Household Security in Northern Pakistan," Himalaya, the Journal of
the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies: Vol. 16: No. 1, Article 8.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya/vol16/iss1/8
Indigenous Labour Arrangements and Household Security in Northern 
Pakistan 
Ken I. MacDonald 
Department of Geography, University of Toronto 
Introduction 
How any community provides a material basis of 
security for its members is a function of the allocation 
of time and resources (i.e., labour) devoted to the 
minimization of risk. In this paper, I argue that the 
time and effort devoted to the minimization of risk is 
not distinct from, and is indeed integral to, the 
organization and practice of everyday life. Labour 
arrangements exist as an important element of social 
and economic organization and thus affect the 
vulnerability or security of individual households. Yet 
this relationship between labour arrangements and 
household security, like many aspects of smallholder 
household organization, has generally been ignored 
within the study of natural hazards and vulnerability 
(MacDonald 1994). In this paper, I refer to a variety of 
labour arrangement strategies in the Karakoram 
mountain village of Askole to illustrate how particular 
labour arrangements, and the relations of authority that 
sanction them, reduce the vulnerability and, de facto, 
increase the security of household members. The 
argument I present relies on certain premises drawn 
from recent research in natural hazards which confronts 
and reformulates traditional conceptions of risk and 
hazard (Hewitt, 1983, Watts 1983, Douglas 1992). 
These premises include: 
a) that specific hazards in any environment are an 
intrinsic part of that environment, and that societies 
with a long history of habitation in those environments 
have developed relationships which reduce the threat to 
production and reproduction posed by environmental 
fluctuations; 
b) the mediation of environmental relations which 
affect vulnerability of individuals and communities both 
flow from, and modify, the conditions of everyday life; 
c) the allocation of time and resources (i.e., the 
effort or labour) devoted to the avoidance or 
minimization of risk, and the ability to respond to 
hazard flow from the routinized and repetitive strategic 
conduct of individuals who typically reside within the 
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social collective of a household and fall under the 
governance of its institutions of authority; and 
d) that as human-environment relations are largely 
structured through the intentional and active 
transformation of nature for survival, labour is 
obviously a key element in the mediation of 
environmental relations that minimize risk. 
The Physical and Social Context of 
Production in Askole 
Askole (75°50° E 35°41° N), the uppermost 
settlement in the Braldu valley of northern Pakistan, is 
situated at an altitude of 3050 m on a large terrace fan 
about 200m above the Braldu river (Fig. 1). With a 
population of about 370, Askole has, until recently, 
remained relatively isolated from much of the 
modernization and planned development occurring 
throughout the Karakoram range. The economy of the 
village is primarily based on subsistence agro-
pastoralism. Production occurs on terraced fields near 
the valley floor and livestock follow vertical 
transhumant cycles to high altitude pastures. Wage 
labour, however, has become increasingly important in 
the regional economy since partition from India. 
Villagers acquire cash primarily through their service to 
the adventure tourism industry. Due to its close 
proximity to a number of the world's highest peaks and 
longest glaciers, the area has become increasingly 
popular with climbers and trekkers. Despite this, most 
men are only sporadic participants in the adventure 
tourism industry. All villagers have access to the land 
and strategic resources they require for survival. 
The physical situation of Askole is typical of many 
Karakoram villages, but would definitely be considered 
hazardous in conventional terms. The nucleated 
settlement and household-controlled fields are contained 
between a steep rock wall to the north and a river-cut 
cliff to the south. The rock wall is prone to recurrent 
mass movements and frequent landslides along the river-
cut cliff pose a significant land-loss hazards to village 
inhabitants. Askole is also located in a single cropping 
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zone and has a regionally short growing season of 
approximately 140 days. Livestock travel to high 
altitude pastures in various stages between late July and 
late October. Fieldwork, however, extends year round, 
with the most intensive period between mid-April and 
mid-October. The village, like many Karakoram 
communities, is located in an arid zone with average 
growing season precipitation of 30mm. Production, 
then, is completely dependent on irrigation from high 
altitude snow and ice melt. The short growing season 
leads to a significant problem with late spring and early 
autumnal frosts, as well as potential inequalities in the 
seasonal distribution of water. Other recurring 
damaging events include mass movements, wind 
storms, crop diseases, and epidemics. 
Cropped land is held privately within the household, 
whereas grazing land is held as a village commons, with 
equal access to all villagers. The household is the basic 
productive and social unit in the village, yet all 
households experience periods of growth and decline so 
that, although large extended households are seen as the 
ideal type, the actual distribution of household types in 
the village ranges from single nuclear families to four-
generation joint extended family households. This 
waxing and waning of household status results in the 
existence of households with a varied resource base (i.e., 
resource-rich and resource-poor households) and a 
differential ability to cope with seasonal labour 
bottlenecks and sudden labour demands. Outside of the 
household, lineage allegiances are quite strong in the 
village, and while there is a clan structure - villagers 
belong to one of 5 clans - the nucleated order of 
settlement in Askole supports strong social and 
economic relationships on the basis of neighbourhood 
rather than clan allegiances. 
Risk Mediation and Rational Diversity 
Concordant with its physical situation, Askole's 
farming system effectively reduces risk and 
accommodates most environmental problems either 
through specifically targeting a hazard such as erosion, 
or through social and ecological practices which spread 
risk across the ecological and social surfaces of 
production. The characteristic risk-reducing feature of 
Askole's agro-ecology is a rational diversity in the 
ecological, economic and social organization of 
production. 
In reviewing the means employed to mediate risk 
and absorb and deal with hazards in Askole, I 
distinguish between agro-ecological practices and social 
practices. Few of these practices, however, are 
particular to any specific damaging geophysical agent. 
Rather, a rational diversity means that risk is mediated 
and a broad range of hazards can be prepared for, through 
specific ecological practices (e.g., intercropping or 
spatially disp~rsed fields) (Table 1). 
TABLE 1 
30 
Selected risk mediating agro-ecological practices in Askole 
•CROP PRODUCTION 
• Dispersed land holdings. 
• Agro-pastoralism with mixed cropping. 
• Heterogeneous cropping landscape. 
• Intercropping. 
• Polyvarietal planting of staple crop including an early variety. 
• Delayed planting of short-duration secondary crop. 
• Crop rotation. 
• Erosion reduction 
terracing of slope 
division of fields into irrigation beds 
planting of vegetation in gullies 
construction of step terraces in gullies 
field reclamation techniques. 
• Co-ordinated experimentation with new innovations and planting material. 
• LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION 
• Species diversity. 
• Vertical transhumant cycles. 
• Spatial dispersal of pastures. 
• Communal tenure of pastures. 
• Flexible supervision of livestock at pasture. 
• Co-ordinated movement of collective village herds and flocks. 
• Herd size limited by ability to stall feed animals. 
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I do not mean to promote an uncritical view of 
Askole, its inhabitants, their farming system, or their 
capacity for environmental management, but it is 
apparent that Askolepong operate a farming system, 
with strong risk-reducing elements, which is well 
prepared to buffer periodic threats to a subsistence food 
supply. These practices, however - a diversified and 
risk-reducing adaptive agriculture - cannot exist apart 
from, and indeed is structured through, the organization 
of society. 
While agro-ecological practices deal with the more 
immediately apparent or dangerous hazards, the 
responsibility for dealing with those less 'knowable' 
risks or hazards is unloaded onto institutional processes 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). In this way, regardless 
of the degree of certainty surrounding environmental 
conditions, individual security is maintai-ned through 
established social relationships and the expectation, 
through subscription to a set of collective values, that 
one's kin, friends and neighbours will be of assistance 
in the event of a serious crisis which poses a threat to 
subsistence or household reproduction (Douglas 1978, 
Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). 
In Ask ole, the household is the primary locus of 
security which, depending on size, demographic 
constitution, and political status, provides varying 
degrees of security for its members. Within the extended 
family households, individual security is enhanced 
through co-operative sharing of productive tasks which 
reduces the threat of subsistence crises for individuals 
and constituent families. It is also the normative status 
of the household which ties individuals into networks or 
frameworks of social relationships which can provide 
access to shelter and strategic resources in the event of a 
crisis. In Askole, these relationships operate first as 
networks of mutual aid which are unique to particular 
households (e.g., established through ties of 
consanguineal kinship, marriage, friendship or contract), 
~nd second, as relations and moral obligations of 
cooperation and assistance centred on the wider society 
(e.g., reciprocal arrangements between lineage 
households, neighbours, and normative expectations of 
assistance at the village level, such as voluntary 
workgroups). This social organization of the village 
establishes and maintains certain social relationships 
and practices which can help a household to retain 
viability in the face of a broad spectrum of crisis-
inducing circumstances. In short, social organization in 
Askole emphasizes social reproduction through the 
continuance of the household as the locus of security for 
individual villagers (Table 2). It is a survival vehicle 
(Adams 1981). 
TABLE 2 
Selected risk mediating social practices in Askole 
• Nucleated settlement form. 
• Multi-generational complex households. 
• Extended family households as locus of production, distribution and consumption. 
• Economic diversification within household. 
• Collective ownership of productive resources within the household. 
• Moral philosophy of self-help and self-reliance within household. 
• Absence of wife seclusion. 
• Lineage adoption and fosterage. 
• Collective labour arrangements 
voluntary work groups 
communal work groups 
stock associateships 
threshing partnerships. 
• Codified norm of household turn-taking in communal duties. 
• Strategic marriage alliances. 
• Obligations of mutual aid and norms of balanced and generalized reciprocity based on agnatic and affinal 
kin relationships. 
• A ceremonial polity which binds social ties, redistributes wealth and affirms social commitments to the 
village ethic. 
Risk Reduction, the Household and Labour 
Arrangements 
For the most part, fieldwork and the labour it 
demands are the responsibility of individual households. 
However, given the seasonality of production in the 
village and the dispersed spatial surface of production, 
situations do exist where labour can be a constraining 
factor in maintaining subsistence. To overcome these 
constraints, conventions of labour allocation within 
society aid village households. These operate both in 
support of routine activities and to overcome more 
regular periodic labour shortages. Outside of the 
physical context of the household, then, it is the 
understood mutual obligations of kinship and co-
residence in the village that mitigate the vulnerability of 
households. These obligations are rooted in different 
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social foundations but are manifested in various forms 
of shared labour arrangements such as those outlined 
below (Table 3). 
Labour Arrangements in Support of Routine 
Fieldwork 
Under the rubric of social obligation, a range of 
networks outside of the household may be relied upon 
to provide labour for day-to-day activities and to provide 
buffers against crisis. The most specific and reliable of 
these, however, are commonly found amongst close 
patrilineal kin such as the localized lineage. 
Cross-household Lineage Partnerships are effective 
during periods of peak labour demands when labour 
from large lineage households is frequently pledged to 
labour-poor lineage households. Individual households 
may operate in co-operative clusters but these 
arrangements do not 'free' household labour to any great 
extent, and definitely not to a sufficient degree to permit 
full participation in alternate economic opportunities 
such as portering. But they do help to offset the 
material effects of low producer/consumer ratios for 
small families, and minimize the potential of shortage 
when faced with a sudden demand for labour. Through 
co-operation in daily tasks, a commitment to lineage 
security and survival is constantly expressed. More 
importantly, this continual expression of mutual 
reliance reflects an absolute relationship in which the 
combined resources of lineage households become the 
last line of defense for any member-household facing an 
impending or actual subsistence crisis. 
TABLE 3 
Risk-mediating Labour Arrangements in Askole village 
• Labour Arrangements in Support of Routine Fieldwork 
• Cross-household Lineage Partnerships 
• Cross-household Extra-Lineage Partnerships 
• Individual Extra-Kin Agreements or Contracts 
• Labour Arrangements in Support of Periodic Tasks 
• Co-operative Work Groups 
• Affinal Kin Obligatory Labour 
• Clan-based Obligatory Labour 
Communal Labour Arrangements in Support of Seasonal Tasks and Contingent Needs 
• Public Service Duties allocated through the metanorm of ress (turn-taking) 
• Communal Work Groups 
Cross-Household Extra -Lineage Partnerships 
operate much like lineage partnerships and are effective 
during times of peak labour or resource demands (eg., 
harvest and threshing). Formal cross-household 
partnerships exist to provide resource or labour poor 
households with access to the wider and more balanced 
reserves of the village. 
Individual Extra-Kin Agreements or Contracts. 
Outside of kin based obligations, rights and duties, 
villagers occasionally engage in individual agreements 
or contracts (kha ngis byet; lit. the work of two 
mouths). These arrangements can help to overcome 
labour shortages or subsistence crises for households 
that lack access to support from lineage mates. They 
are also used to obtain support for non-traditional 
activities. In Askole, norms of reciprocity apply only 
to elements of the traditional household economy and do 
not apply to market-oriented activities such as shop-
keeping and craft production. Increasingly, these 
contracts tend to resemble emergent patron-client 
relationships within an expanding market economy. 
These arrangements are far from mutually exclusive 
in relation to any particular task and, at any given time 
can all be found regulating the same task within 
different households. For example, the labour required 
to manage livestock while at pasture households may be 
arranged through lineage partnerships, extra-lineage 
agreements and contracts. 
Labour Arrangements in Support of Periodic 
Tasks 
While the arrangements listed above certainly apply 
to all contingencies, alternate forms of labour 
arrangement can be called on periodically. These rely 
on both village and extra-village relationships. 
Co-operative Work Groups come together on an ad 
hoc voluntary basis whenever they are required by a 
household, usually to repair household lands and 
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buildings. Assistance is given on the basis of 
generalized reciprocity (and rarely if ever refused) and 
permits some households to overcome limits placed on 
their ability to respond to hazard by a lack of labour. 
Such co-operative arrangements help to buffer the 
potential marginality of smaller households with poor 
access to alternate economic activities (indeed they 
reduce the potential increase in vulnerability created 
through household partition which implicitly reduces 
household labour supply). 
Affinal Kin Obligatory Labour. Aside from direct 
agnatic ties and lineage obligations, established 
relationships with affinal kin can be relied upon to help 
buffer subsistence crises. These are maintained and 
strengthened through periodic visits to the spouse's 
natal household, and a continuing commitment to these 
relationships· is partially expressed through the practice 
of cross-cousin marriage. These affinal relationships 
can be important in overcoming seasonal labour 
bottlenecks or resource shortages. 
Clan-based Obligatory Labour Beyond relying on 
the assistance of localized lineage members and affinal 
kin in the case of need, households can expect to receive 
a certain degree of assistance from fellow clan members. 
In general, such help includes access to resources and 
labour, but this aid forms a part of a balanced reciprocal 
relationship. Notably, given Askole's nucleated spatial 
structure, the reliability of clan-based reciprocity 
diminishes with kin and spatial distance and a household 
may find more help from unrelated neighbours than 
from relatives living at the edge of the kin network. 
Communal Labour Arrangements in Support 
of Seasonal Tasks and the Contingent Needs 
of the Village 
Communal Work Groups are formed through 
sanction both at stipulated times and as needed to 
provide the labour required to maintain village 
infrastructure. These continual efforts to maintain and 
repair village resources can be seen as an 'everyday' 
passive approach to risk management and the protection 
of vulnerable land. But these co-operative groups are 
also important in effecting a collective response to 
hazard, as they permit a rapid response to environmental 
fluctuations. These groups not only alleviate periodic 
labour shortages, but also curtail the extent of loss in 
the event of hazard and allow the village to repair 
damage and return to a focus on production within a 
relatively short time following a crisis, without 
assistance from external agencies. 
Public Service Duties allocated through the norm of 
ress (turn-taking). The labour supply for a wide range 
of communal tasks is governed by the norm of ress 
(turn-taking) Within the political domain, this process 
is a means of "abjuring tyrannical rule by the few over 
the many", or of avoiding the control of one social 
group by another (Parker 1991; 354). As the 
responsibility for administration and security of the 
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village is diffused among all village households over 
time, ress is the process which symbolizes total 
community involvement in the exercise of authority, 
encourages civic responsibility and social integration, 
and reciprocally binds the household to the village. It is 
largely through the role of ress in allocating labour that 
the welfare and social reproduction of the household is 
inextricably bound to the welfare and social reproduction 
of the village. 
Risk Reduction, Labour and Household 
Authority 
To this point, I have attempted to illustrate that a 
risk-reducing capacity in Askole exists and has 
historically emerged, in part, through the capable and 
knowledgeable actions of the villagers - that is , 
through their management of labour. However, these 
actions do not operate in a structural void. Ultimately, 
the risk-reducing characteristics of specific ecological or 
social practices are realized through the intelligent 
allocation of time, tools, and resources. This 
management is the responsibility of local institutions 
of authority. It is these institutions that authorize and 
allocate the necessary time, energy and resources, and 
sanction the practices and social forms that create a 'risk 
averse utility surface' (Watts 1983), and attempt to 
avoid pre-conditioning the community to disaster. 
There are two primary institutions of authority in 
Askole which directly affect decision making and the 
allocation of household labour and resources. These are 
the household head (khang-go) and the village 'manager' 
(yul ltumpa). A third institution of authority, the 
village headman (trampa), figures prominently in 
communal life and extra-village relations, but has little 
direct control over the allocation of village labour or 
resources. Notably, these are all what I call 'traditional' 
institutions of authority meaning that they have not 
been superimposed by the state, but rather have 
historically derived legitimacy from within the 
community. 
Khang-go 
Within the household, the khang-go, along with his 
female equivalent the dakhmo, manages household 
resources, authorizes work projects and allocates the 
time, labour and materials needed to complete those 
projects. He is the primary decision maker in the 
household, and within the context of local knowledge, 
the constraints of traditional customs and norms, (e.g., 
gender division of labour) and overarching authority 
relations, he determines, on a seasonal basis, the 
productive landscape of the household - a landscape that 
I have described as risk minimizing. In both economic 
production and social organization, the khang-go plays a 
central role in perpetuating risk reduction and social 
security. 
Along with maintaining a constant risk-minimizing 
surface of production, the khang-go also plays a role 
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during hazardous events (e.g., frosts) by reallocating the 
time, labour, tools, and resources among household 
projects and mobilizing them to curtail the impending 
or actual crisis. It is also the responsibility of the 
khang- go to contribute household resources to 
communal efforts to deal with hazards. Beyond this, the 
khang-go, operating within certain well-defined cultural 
criteria, shapes the economic diversity of households by 
deciding which members can participate in the porter 
trade, or engage in the production of crafts. He also has 
ultimate, but accountable, authority over the 
disbursements of the proceeds from these activities 
which can be used to help avert or buffer the impact of a 
subsistence crisis. 
In summary, from the perspective of the household, 
the khang-go defines institutional projects, and 
structures those activities responsible for maintaining 
the agro-ecological and social practices that reduce risk 
and provide a degree of security. In doing so, he is 
integral to minimizing the vulnerability of the 
household and its members. 
Yul ltumpa 
The broader concerns of labour allocation in the 
village are regulated by the village 'manager' (yul 
ltumpa), an institution charged with regulating seasonal 
life in the village. Yul ltumpong (pl.) are selected 
annually, on the normative principle of ress, from a 
rotational schedule of households. In Askole, four men 
(usually household heads) serve as yul ltumpong for a 
one year term. Responsibilities of yul ltumpong 
include the pronouncement and enforcement of village 
laws, the vigilant monitoring of field and pasture 
conditions during the agricultural season to ensure 
compliance with norms, and the remedy of infractions 
before they result in damage or conflict. They are also 
responsible for regulating access to community 
resources such as irrigation water and pasture. In this 
sense, then, yul ltumpong, are decision makers who 
govern the pace of production for the village as a whole. 
The authority of yul ltumpong over the definition 
and realization of communal projects, and their ability 
to impose sanctions to ensure the completion of those 
projects, provide the capacity to respond effectively to 
environmental events which threaten social reproduction 
and community viability. In response to any hazard, 
they have the ability to authorize new projects and 
commandeer and allocate labour and resources to curtail 
the damage. This capacity is also related to their 
sanctioned control over the seasonal relations of 
production, and the management of communal 
resources. In carrying out these responsibilities, they 
continually provide a degree of security by maintaining 
risk reducing practices. In their exercise of authority, 
then, yul ltumpong provide a measure of security 
and either minimize or attempt to equalize vulnerability 
among all village households. 
Conclusion 
34 
The main points that I want to make here are: 
a) that both the mediation of risk and the potential 
for disaster, in small, subsistence oriented communities 
like Askole stem from the conditions of everyday life; 
and 
b) that the risk reduction, or the security system of 
material life, that is practiced in everyday life, 
specifically in those institutional projects aimed at 
ensuring seasonal agricultural production and the social 
reproduction of the household, are realized through 
durable labour arrangements and reliant on the 
implemented decisions of agents of authority. 
I must add, however, that the ability to implement 
decisions is dependent upon the continued legitimation 
of these agents which is supported, in part, by their 
expressions of commitment to a morally based set of 
collective values held by all village residents. There 
are, however, differing degrees of participation, with 
young men demonstrating less interest than old. 
Evidence of this emerging conflict is becoming 
increasingly clear in Askole largely through the 
activities of the adventure tourism industry which, by 
prioritizing values of self-interest, and notions of 
private goods as opposed to communal good and 
collective ownership, has set up a trend toward civil 
privatism which is in conflict with collective values. 
Local development initiatives also threaten to disrupt 
contextually rational practices and to confound the 
authority of traditional institutions. 
These threats to collective values and rational 
practice are manifest, partially at least, as a challenge to 
the legitimacy claims of 'traditional' institutions of 
authority (evident, for example in a resistance to 
authority and premature partitioning of households). 
This in itself, is not necessarily harmful when it occurs 
in isolated cases- i.e., the case of a 'bad' leader; but here 
it is the legitimacy of the individual, not the 
institution, that is being challenged. If we accept the 
assertion that legitimacy underlies social stability, as 
expressed in its ability to adapt to strains or changes 
confronting it, when this challenge becomes consistent, 
a legitimation crisis, to borrow from Habermas (1975), 
erodes the ability of the social system to mediate risk or 
uncertainty and increases the vulnerability of household 
members to subsistence crises. 
The ability to mediate risk through labour and 
minimize the vulnerability of individuals is certainly a 
function of the labour arrangements that exist in a given 
context. But more importantly, these are reciprocally 
bound to a set of collective values which maintains a 
common interest in the good of the 'Other' and to the 
ability of sanctioning institutions to maintain those 
arrangements. The durability of risk-reducing labour 
practices is challenged when the values and authority 
which sanction them come under threat. This threat 
seems to be reaching the village of Askole now. I 
presume that it has already reached numerous other 
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